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In conversation with me Jean-Claude Passeron recently recollected that, for his agrégation in the 
late 1950s, he had been asked to imagine a conversation between Bergson and Plato in hell.  It 
was this kind of exercise which caused Passeron and others to target the agrégation as the most 
manifest symbol of an education system which was devoted to the esoteric exclusion of common 
discourse and common people, seeing it as a rite de passage to a socially divisive academic 
professionalism.  In the year of publication of Les héritiers (1964), four of the young researchers 
who had collaborated in the fieldwork leading to that text (Bourdieu, Passeron, Reynaud, and 
Tréanton), co-authored an article, under the pseudonym of Emile Boupareytre, entitled 
“L’université et son universitaire”, which appeared in Esprit.  At the same time as they were 
analysing the social conditions of pedagogical comunication between staff and students of 
Sociology and Philosophy in sample French universities, they were critical in this article of the 
procedure by which staff were legitimated or, to use their term, consecrated:  “je suis consacré.  
Le succès n’est plus une sélection, c’est une ordination:  tu sera agrégé in aeternum …” [I am 
consecrated.  Success is no more a selection, it is an ordination:  you will be an agrégé for 
eternity …] (Boupareytre, 1964, 843).  Anticipating the problems of 1968, they argued that the 
old university system was intent on reproducing itself but was no longer fit for the purpose 
expected of it in modern, industrial society.  It was not by chance, they claimed, that ‘le 
syndicalisme étudiant revendique un rapport pédagogique démocratique et direct au moment où 
il est devenu impossible de l’instaurer dans les faits’ [student unions lay claim to direct, 
democratic pedagogy at the moment when it has become impossible to realise it practically] 
(Boupareytre, 1964, 847).  Subseqently, Bourdieu and Passeron both struggled with the problem 
of how the articulation and publication of their research findings could avoid being absorbed 
within the system of privilege which they were wanting to subvert.  In Le métier de sociologue 
(Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1968) they argued for the construction of an epistemic 
community of sociologists.  In the 1970s the differences of opinion between them about the 
constitution of such a community became apparent.  Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 1984) 
analysed the social constitution of an academic community and ethos, whereas, in Les mots de la 
sociologie (Passeron, 1980), Passeron focussed on an analysis of the words and concepts which 
defined sociological discourse.  Passeron early disputed Bourdieu’s interpretation of their jointly 
authored La Reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970), arguing that Bourdieu was wrong to 
deny the autonomy of cultural reproduction and to ‘reduce’ it to social reproduction, but this 
difference was concealed within the text perhaps by a tension between its form and content, 
between its propositions and its elaborative discussions.  The tension is, perhaps, between the 
philosophical universality of the propositions and the particularity of the discussions of 
sociological application. 
 
Simon Susen’s first book sets itself the daunting task of trying to reconcile elements of the 
thinking of Bourdieu and Habermas and to construct a viable synthesis.  In no sense does he 
imagine a conversation between Bourdieu and Habermas in hell, but, formally it does feel as if 
he is offering a surrogate conversation, or mediating an intellectual encounter in his own mind.  
The text clearly represents his PhD thesis.  It appears to have been a thesis which was the 
product of a range of cultures of production.  The brief biography on the inside cover highlights 
that he received his PhD from the University of Cambridge and ‘studied sociology, politics, and 
philosophy at various universities and research centres around the world, including the 
University of Edinburgh, the Colegio de Mexico, the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias 
Sociales in Mexico City, and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris.’  The 
Acknowledgements make special mention of, amongst others, Bryan Turner and John 
Thompson in Cambridge and Luc Boltanski in Paris.  Susen was for a while a lecurer at 
Goldsmiths’ College, University of London and he now teaches at the University of Newcastle 
where, in part, he replaces William Outhwaite.  He has, therefore, come under the influence of 
academics who have worked closely with Bourdieu, are experts on Habermas, or have 
themselves found affinities between the two in their own work.  He also expresses his gratitude 
to a multinational gathering of friends, reflecting the situations in which he has studied and 
researched.  If, therefore, the text reflects the possibility of ‘a field of World Sociology’ as 
discussed by Bourdieu in his epilogue to Social Theory for a Changing Society (Bourdieu & 
Coleman, eds., 1989), does this development run the risk of de-particularising the social, of 
universalising a socially privileged academic gaze, as, I believe, Bourdieu came to fear in the 
1990s, causing him to become sceptical about the international exchange of ideas and, instead, 
to immerse himself in social and political engagement in France?  Peter Hamilton and Bryan 
Turner are to be congratulated on publishing this text in Bardwell Press in a series devoted to 
‘European Studies in Social Theory’, but the question has to be asked how Susen’s book stands 
in relation to the ambivalence of the series title.  Is this a study of European social theory, that is 
to say of two European theorists; is it a study which has been predominantly generated within 
European cultures – of social theory; or do questions of geographical situatedeness have no 
place, either in respect of the author or of the subjects of his analysis?  The problem is partly 
illustrated linguistically as well as socially.  The book is written lucidly in good English and 
Susen obviously reads and thinks and expresses himself as happily in French and German.  On 
occasions there seems to be a slightly indiscriminate linguistic inter-changeability.  Sometimes, 
for instance, Bourdieu’s concepts are discussed in English by reference to a German ‘translation’ 
and it is not always clear whether the transferability between French and German is seeking to 
establish a linguistic homology between Bourdieu and Habermas or a differentiation, nor is it 
clear how the Franco-German expressions should be discussed in English1
 
.    To follow my 
discussion of the relationship between Bourdieu and Passeron, therefore, it is not clear where 
this text is rooted, either socially or linguistically. 
This is an important issue because Susen’s text is a manifestation of the problem which it 
considers.  Susen provides a brilliant exposition of the philosophical understanding of the social 
world in the work of, first, in Part I, Habermas, and then, in Part II,  Bourdieu.  Each part is 
divided into four chapters, the first of which expounds the theory;the second of which examines 
the debate over the theory; the third of which analyses the paradigm shifts in the theories made 
                                         
1 To take one example from Susen’s exposition of the characteristics of the meaning given by Bourdieu to ‘doxa’.  
He states (pp. 140-1) that doxa ‘is a form of unrecognised recognition (une reconnaissance méconnue, or eine 
unerkannte Anerkennung).’ This is given a footnote (16) on page 146:  “It should be noted that in English the word 
‘recognition’ can have at least three different meanings:  first, the ‘conscious identification of something or 
somebody as such’ (Erkennung or Erkenntnis);  second, the ‘granting of a certain status to something or somebody 
as such’ (Anerkennung); and, third, the ‘repeated identification of something or somebody as such’ 
(Wiedererkennung) …”  There is no reference to Bourdieu’s use of ‘une reconnaissance méconnue’ and the 
exegesis is of German terminology rather than Bourdieusian.  The more typical usage of Bourdieu was 
‘méconnaissance’ about which Richard Nice commented in his translator’s introduction to Reproducetion that ‘The 
term ‘misrecognition’ epitomizes the translator’s quandary;  in French méconnaissance is a simple word though 
given a specific scientific sense’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977, xviii).  This exegesis exemplifies Susen’s tendency to 
suppose that concepts are capable of being discussed universally independent of their linguistic formulation rather 
than to suppose that concepts are linguistically constituted and, therefore, have particular meanings in particular 
linguistic fields.  As I argue further, this tendency is apparent in the formal presentation of competing philosophical 
positions throughout the book.  In this respect Susen seems tacitly to work with an assumption which is shared by 
neither Bourdieu nor Habermas – that of ‘hermeneutic idealism’ or ‘pure’ linguistics (p.240). 
by the authors; and the last of which considers the shortcomings of these shifts.  Habermas’s 
theory is characterised generally as ‘critical theory’ and Bourdieu’s generally as ‘reflexive 
sociology’.  Systematically, and with meticulous scholarship, Susen breaks down these 
alternative theories into propositional categories and he subjects all to rigorous examination, 
discussing the pros and cons of the positions adopted by his subjects.  Many of his localised 
expositions and commentaries are stunning.  As Bryan Turner comments in his helpful 
foreword, “The Foundations of the Social is not a book for the faint-hearted.  It requires careful 
and painstaking reading, but it will endlessly repay the scrupulous reader who will find here a 
rich and rewarding text.” (p. 15).  Susen’s book is densely argued but it is clearly sign-posted 
and is presented through a series of short sub-sections in which the argument advances through 
exposition, criticism and recapitulation.  I think it is possible to suggest that Susen is more 
sympathetic to the Bourdieusian project of reflexive sociology which, in his view, ‘represents a 
systematic attempt to understand the nature of the social by comprehending itself as part of the 
social’ (p.133).  However, in spite of this apparent preference for the content of Bourdieu’s 
theory, my reservation is that the formal structure of the book ensures that Bourdieu’s position is 
appreciated on Habermas’s terms.  The pros and cons of social theoretical discourses, including 
Bourdieu’s insistence on the primacy of the social, are evaluated philosophically or abstractly 
without reference to the social conditions of their production.  It is as if Susen extrapolates two 
ideal-typical theoretical positions for evaluation.  This has the effect, as Bourdieu would say, of 
de-contextualising, de-temporalising and de-spatialising the ideas of the two authors. (See 
Bourdieu’s “Concluding Remarks:  for a Sociogenetic Understanding of Intellectual Works” in 
Calhoun, LiPuma, & Postone, eds., 1993, 263-275).  Susen’s typical mode of presentation is to 
offer a summary of an author’s position in his main text and to support this summary with 
footnotes which, firstly, refer to texts of the author in question and, secondly, refer to 
interpretations ‘in the secondary literature’.  The discussion of ‘the paradigm shift within critical 
theory’ in chapter 3, for instance, refers to 17 Habermas texts first published, either in German 
or English, between 1971 and 2001, and 65 secondary texts, ranging alphabetically from 
Alexander to White and with publication dates ranging from 1980 to 2005.  In the interest of 
generating a debatable ideal type of critical theory, therefore, Susen denies the development of 
Habermas’s theory in relation to changing social and political circumstances and absorbs the 
different perspectives contained within the secondary literature.  In the section on ‘Knowledge 
and Interest:  Normative Discourses’ in the chapter on ‘The Concept of Critical Theory’ (chapter 
1), Susen does comment that “According to the early Habermasian account of the 
interpenetration between knowledge and human interests, three scientific spheres have emerged” 
(p.37) and this refers to a footnote (25) in which Susen states that “It should be noted that the 
‘late’ Habermas self-critically distances himself from the schematic and evolutionist character of 
his ‘early’ tripartite conception of knowledge-constitutive interests …” (p.43), but this is a rare 
gesture towards the historicising of theory production and the use of inverted commas in the 
footnote suggests that Susen is, at best, sceptical about historical differentiation.  Equally rare 
are attempts to represent the thinking of his subjects by reference to that of any ‘classical’ 
sociologists or philosophers.  It is symptomatic of the mode of argument that a book which seeks 
to synthesize different ways of conceptualising the ‘life-world’ in relation to the ‘system-world’ 
or primary experience in relation to objective knowledge has no references at all in the text to 
either Husserl or Heidegger. 
 
Susen seems to find himself unavoidably situating his text in an academic system-world even 
though his purpose, finally, deploying in combination the terminology of Habermas and 
Bourdieu, is to energise the emancipatory potential of primary experience:  “Any societal project 
that aims at the emancipation of the human condition but fails to address the variegated 
emancipatory potentials inherent in the human species is necessarily in vain” (p.316).  This is a 
conclusion which is offered as a prescription for future endeavour.  I applaud this, but my view 
is that it is in part because Susen at times misrepresents Bourdieu that he does not seem to 
realise that this closely resembles Bourdieu’s contention nor that his way of writing about 
Bourdieu and Habermas privileges Habermas in such a way as to make his desired 
ontologically-based project less attainable. 
 
It is a tribute to Susen’s book that nearly every page necessitates a response.  I found myself 
constantly checking whether I could accept the representations of the positions of Habermas and 
Bourdieu as accurate and, additionally, whether, regardless of the accuracy of the 
representations, I was convinced by the arguments.  In relation to his representation of Bourdieu, 
in particular, there were occasions when I was convinced by the abstract arguments but doubtful 
whether they arose from an accurate interpretation of the author.  I can only elaborate on this 
briefly in respect of a mis/representation of Bourdieu’s position which becomes a cornerstone of 
Susen’s overall thesis.  Chapter 5 introduces the Bourdieusian project of reflexive sociology 
which, as Susen rightly states, ‘represents a systematic attempt to understand the nature of the 
social by comprehending itself as part of the social’ (p.133).  Susen proceeds to expound this 
position lucidly in terms with which I have no argument:  “Far from pretending to formulate a 
scholastic, disinterested, and incontestable account of the social, reflexive sociology seeks to 
acknowledge and problematise its own practical, interested, and contestable immersion in social 
reality” (p.133) and:  “Hence, reflexive sociology is not only the study of the social in general, 
but also the study of sociology in particular, i.e. the ‘sociology of sociology’” (p. 133-4).  Susen 
argues that this means that reflexive sociology is distinguished from ‘mainstream’ sociology in 
several ways, the first of which is that it is ‘a project of science’, by which Susen means that 
“Social science, in the Bourdieusian sense, can be defined as the systematic attempt to uncover 
the underlying mechanisms which causally determine both the constitution and the evolution of 
the social world” (p.134).  It now begins to become clear where Susen is taking this 
representation.  He concludes this sub-section:  “Rather than representing an intrinsic capacity of 
the subject, reflexivity is believed to be a capacity of science.  In brief, the subject is enabled by 
the enabling power of science.” (p.134).  Susen is moving towards the contention that 
Bourdieu’s emphasis of science is associated with a denial of the intrinsic capacities of subjects.  
He goes on to claim that ‘it is assumed’ (supposedly by Bourdieu?) ‘that not only a distinction 
has to be drawn between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge, but that this distinction 
describes a qualitative hierarchy.  Scientific knowledge is superior to ordinary knowledge 
insofar as the former possesses the distinctive quality of freeing itself from the praxis-embedded 
illusions of the latter.’ (p.136).  Constructing an exegesis of Bourdieu’s position which pays 
attention to the social and intellectual conditions of its development does, I believe, demonstrate 
that to suppose that Bourdieu placed distinctive science at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of 
knowledge is to generate a misrepresentative extrapolation from Bourdieu’s statements.  There 
was certainly a Marxist undercurrent to the educational research of the 1960s, the sense that 
sociology could remove the méconnaissance of their situations of actors and this undercurrent 
persisted into La Reproduction, perhaps influenced by the work of Althusser in the same period 
and his work with the same title.  There was certainly the sense that Bourdieu’s Algerian 
fieldwork was conducted on the assumption that there was a colonial disjunction between the 
analysis of metropolitan anthropologists and the self-understandings of tribespeople – what 
Passeron subsequently called the asssumption of ‘pure alterity’ which was wrongly transposed 
on Bourdieu’s return to the ‘mixed alterity’ of mainland France (Grignon & Passeron, 1989) – 
and also the sense, derived from Durkheim and expressed in Bachelardian terms in Le métier de 
sociologue (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1968), that science has to be constructed 
against the ‘prenotions’ current in society, but, in the early 1970s, Bourdieu was groping 
towards a methodological reformulation.  He insisted that the three modes of theoretical 
knowledge which he articulated in Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (Bourdieu, 1972) ‘may 
be described as moments in a dialectical advance towards adequate knowledge …’ (Bourdieu, 
1977, 3).  The essence of Bourdieu’s critique of Weber at this time was that the ‘ideal-type’ as 
an analytical tool was inadequate in seeking to represent the immanent meaning constructions of 
social agents.  It could still be argued that the dialectical advance advocated by Bourdieu, while 
decidely not being hierarchical, nevertheless still suggested an appropriation of primary 
experience in the interest of the construction of science rather than a recognition of the 
autonomous legitimacy of that experience itself, but I think that Bourdieu’s reading of Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty led him to seek to situate scientific objectification within the life-world in 
parity with other life-world activities.  This orientation is confirmed by the procedure adopted in 
a text which Susen does not cite at all – La misère du monde (Bourdieu, ed., 1993 – where the 
‘research’ team was made up of a group of social subjects who were not ‘scientists’ but who 
shared a common scientific discourse which was juxtaposed with the discourses of the people 
whom they interviewed and encountered socio-analytically. 
 
Susen builds a great deal on what I take to be a misrepresentation of Bourdieu’s project.  The 
construction of the argument develops particularly in chapter  8, devoted to ‘reflection upon 
reflexive sociology’, in which Susen considers three ‘substantial problems that arise when 
analysing the Bourdieusian conception of society’, the third of which is ‘the problem of 
fatalism’.  I find the account of Bourdieu offered here quite unrecognisable.  Susen writes: 
 
“The Bourdieusian notion of the social is based on socio-ontological pessimism.  
Bourdieu’s pessimistic view of the social manifests itself most clearly in the harsh 
distinction between unprivileged ordinary people and privileged social scientists.  The 
alleged insufficiency of ordinary people’s common sense stands in direct contrast to the 
supposedly enlightening pwer of social scientist’s reflexive knowledge.” (p.222) 
 
Susen continues in the same vein for a whole page without adducing any specific evidence in 
Bourdieu’s statements in support of his assertions.  Rather, he gives a summarising sentence to 
the effect that ‘Bourdieusian ‘critical’ or ‘reflexive’ sociology denies the ‘critical’ and 
‘reflexive’ nature of the social itself’ (p.222), a summary which is reinforced by a quote from 
Boltanski and Thévenot which begins (with italics added by Susen): 
 
“The main problem of critical sociology is its inability to understand the critical 
operations undertaken by the actors.  A sociology whuich wants to study the critical 
operations performed by actors - a sociology of criticism taken as a specific object – 
must therefore give up (if only temporarily) the critical stance, in order to recognize the 
normative principles which underlie the critical activity of ordinary persons.” (Boltanski 
& Thévenot, 1999, quoted in Susen, 222-3). 
 
I can concede that, as a man, Bourdieu was beset by warring instincts, between laissez-faire 
libertarianism and totalising control.  He was desperate to secure the rights of the disadvantaged 
to self-expression and self-realisation, but he found it difficult to envisage any self-expression 
that might be different in kind from his own.  It is evidence, however, of a kind of Rousseauistic 
optimism that he supposed that everyone has the capacity to be critically reflexive in his fashion 
and, as a result, has the capacity to satisfy the requirements of the Kantian ethical agenda, with 
its consequential potential for republican political participation. 
 
It is a big step from arguing that Bourdieu failed to recognise the critical autonomy of the social 
‘other’ to making the claim that to renounce temporarily the authoritarian critical stance which 
imposes its own criticality on others must lead to the recognition of ‘normative principles’ 
underlying the activity of ordinary persons rather than simply to an adequate recognition of the 
pragmatic strategies adopted by social agents.  A methodological shortcoming of Bourdieu in 
practice which was at odds with his own prescription becomes the basis for a philosophical 
transformation of his intention.  Arguably, Susen’s attempt to cross-fertilize between the 
thinking of Habermas and Bourdieu is revealed as an attempt to use the contribution of 
Habermas to give substance to Boltanski’s attempt to inject a normative orientation into the 
legacy of Bourdieu’s thought.  My view is that a more sympathetic – and accurate – appreciation 
of Bourdieu’s phenomenological egalitarianism, acknowledging and exploring his indebtedness 
to Husserl’s thinking after Cartesian Meditations, might show that we already have the elements 
necessary for the realisation of Susen’s vision of an emancipatory societal project without 
needing to revive a quest for the normative.  This is not only true in respect of the content of 
Susen’s book, but also of its form.  The  book needs to participate in the actualisation of its 
project.  The ‘foundations of the social’ need to be defined in social exchange which entails 
establishing socially inclusive institutional foundations of social theoretical discourse.  This is 
where we revert to the vision of the pseudonymous Emile Boupareytre, but our universities seem 
now to be rather less fit for this purpose even than in 1964. 
 
Boupareytre, E., 1964, “L’universitaire et son université”, Esprit, 5-6, 834-847. 
 
Bourdieu, P.  1972  Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique, Geneva, Droz. – translated as 
Bourdieu, 1977. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1977 Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P.  1984 Homo Academicus, Paris, Ed de Minuit. - translated as Bourdieu, 1988. 
 
Bourdieu, P.  1988  Homo Academicus, Oxford, Polity Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Chamboredon, J.-C. and Passeron, J.-C., 1968  Le métier de sociologue, 
Paris, Mouton-Bordas. – translated as Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Chamboredon, J.-C. and Passeron, J.-C., 1991 The Craft of Sociology, New 
York, Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Passeron, J.-C., 1970  La Reproduction.  Eléments pour une théorie du 
système d’enseignement,  Paris, Ed de Minuit. – translated as Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977. 
 
Bourdieu, P., with Passeron, J.-C., 1977 Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, 
London-Beverley Hills, Sage Publications. 
 
Calhoun, C., LiPuma, E., Postone, M., eds., 1993,  Bourdieu:  Critical Perspectives, Oxford, 
Polity Press. 
 
Grignon, C., & Passeron, J.-C, 1989, Le savant et le populaire:  misérabilisme et populisme en 
sociologie et en littérature,  Paris, Le Seuil/Gallimard. 
 
Passeron, J.-C, 1980, Les mots de la sociologie, Nantes, Université de Nantes. 
 
 
